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Tuesday
Oct 16, 2012
Galois Tech Talk: Towards a Formally Verified Component Platform
Galois, Inc

Presented by Matthew Fernandez.

In safety- and security-critical environments software failures that are acceptable in other contexts may have expensive or even life-threatening consequences. Formal verification has the potential to provide high assurance for this software, but is regarded as being prohibitively expensive. Although significant advances have been made in this area, verification of larger systems still remains impractical. Component-based development has the potential to lower the cost of system-wide verification, bringing correctness proofs of these large scale systems within reach. This talk will discuss my work that aims to provide a component-based development environment for building systems with high assurance requirements. By providing a formal model of the platform with proven correctness properties that hold at the level of an abstract model right down to the implementation, I hope to reduce the cost of full system verification by allowing reasoning about system components in isolation.

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Friday
Jun 14, 2013
Galois Tech Talk: Non-interference and Binary Correctness of seL4
Galois, Inc

Presented by Gerwin Klein and Thomas Sewell.

This talk introduces two new facets that have recently been added to the seL4 formal verification story: a proof the kernel does not leak information between domains, and a proof that the compiled binary matches the expected semantics of the C source code.

The first part of the talk presents a new non-interference theorem for seL4, which builds on the earlier function correctness verification. The theorem shows how seL4 can be configured as a static separation kernel with dynamic kernel services within each domain.

The binary proof addresses the compiler-correctness assumption of the earlier seL4 proofs by connecting the compiled binary to the refinement chain, thus showing that the seL4 binary used in practice has all of the properties that have been shown of its models. We use the Cambridge ARM model and Magnus Myreen's certifying decompiler, together with a custom correspondence finder for assembly-like programs powered by modern SMT solvers. We cover the previously-verified parts of seL4 as compiled by gcc (4.5.1) at optimisation level 1.

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