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DTSTART:20120311T020000
RDATE:20120311T020000
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CREATED;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20120403T220612Z
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20120413T111500
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20120413T101500
DTSTAMP;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20120403T220612Z
LAST-MODIFIED;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20120419T212040Z
UID:http://calagator.org/events/1250462231
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:\n\nIn this talk\, I describe two side-channel traff
 ic analysis attacks on encrypted voice-over-IP calls and a novel techniq
 ue for efficiently defending against such attacks. We begin with a revie
 w of the basics of speech coding to understand how and why information c
 an leak out of an encrypted VoIP call. We then discuss the techniques fo
 r recovering hidden information: first\, how to identify the language sp
 oken in the call\, and then how to spot particular phrases. Our techniqu
 es are completely speaker-independent\, and require no recorded examples
  of the target phrase. Nevertheless\, we show that they achieve surprisi
 ng accuracy on widely-used speech corpora. Finally\, we consider methods
  for limiting this information leakage. Experimental results show that a
 n intelligent\, adaptive adversary can convincingly deceive such traffic
  analyses while incurring much lower overhead than previously expected.\
 n\nTags: psu\, computer science\, colloquium\, voip\, encryption\n\nImpo
 rted from: http://calagator.org/events/1250462231
URL:http://www.pdx.edu/computer-science/colloquium-and-other-events-0
SUMMARY:Information Leakage from Encrypted Voice over IP: Attacks and Def
 enses
LOCATION:Portland State University Engineering Building\, Room 86-01: 190
 0 SW Fourth Avenue\, Portland Oregon 97201 
SEQUENCE:2
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